

AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION/MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT

BPA NO.

1. CONTRACT ID CODE

PAGE

OF PAGES

2. AMENDMENT/MODIFICATION NO.

THREE

3. EFFECTIVE DATE

SEE BLOCK 15C.

4. REQUISITION/PURCHASE REQ NO.

5. PROJECT NO. (if applicable)

6. ISSUED BY

CODE

REGIONAL ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE OFFICE
USAID/SENEGAL
B.P. 49
DAKAR - SENEGAL

7. ADMINISTERED BY (if other than item 6)

CODE

8. NAME AND ADDRESS OF CONTRACTOR (No., street, county, State and ZIP Code)

ALL POTENTIAL APPLICANTS

(X)

9A. AMENDMENT OF SOLICITATION NO.

RFA No. 685-10-A-03

9B. DATED (SEE ITEM 11)

December 4, 2009

10A. MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT/ORDER NO.

10B. DATED (SEE ITEM 13)

X

CODE

FACILITY CODE

11. THIS ITEM ONLY APPLIES TO AMENDMENTS OF SOLICITATIONS

☐ The above numbered solicitation is amended as set forth in Item 14. The hour and date specified for receipt of Offers ☐ is extended, ☐ is not extended.

Offers must acknowledge receipt of this amendment prior to the hour and date specified in the solicitation or as amended, by one of the following methods:

(a) By completing Items 8 and 15, and returning _____ copies of the amendment; (b) By acknowledging receipt of this amendment of each copy of the offer submitted, or (c) By separate letter or telegram which includes a reference to the solicitation and amendment numbers. FAILURE OF YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO BE RECEIVED AT THE PLACE DESIGNATED FOR THE RECEIPT OF OFFERS PRIOR TO THE HOUR AND DATE SPECIFIED MAY RESULT IN REJECTION OF YOUR OFFER. If by virtue of this amendment you desire to change an offer already submitted, such change may be made by telegram or letter, provided each telegram or letter makes reference to the solicitation and this amendment, and is received prior to the opening hour and date specified.

12. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA (if required)

13. THIS ITEM APPLIES ONLY TO MODIFICATIONS OF CONTRACTS/ORDERS,
IT MODIFIES THE CONTRACT/ORDER NO. AS DESCRIBED IN ITEM 14.

(X) A. THIS CHANGE ORDER IS ISSUED PURSUANT TO (Specify authority) THE CHANGES SET FORTH IN ITEM 14 ARE MADE IN THE CONTRACT ORDER NO. IN ITEM 10A.

B. THE ABOVE NUMBERED CONTRACT/ORDER IS MODIFIED TO REFLECT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES (such as changes in paying office, appropriation date, etc.) SET FORTH IN ITEM 14, PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF FAR 43.103(b).

C. THIS SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT IS ENTERED INTO PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY OF:

D. OTHER (Specify type of modification and authority)

E. IMPORTANT: Contractor ☒ is not, ☐ is required to sign this document and return _____ copies to the issuing office.

14. DESCRIPTION OF AMENDMENT/MODIFICATION (Organized by UCF section headings, including solicitation/contract subject matter where feasible)

(See Continuation Page)

Except as provided herein, all terms and conditions of the document referenced in item 9A or 10A, as heretofore changed, remains unchanged and in full force and effect.

15A. NAME AND TITLE OF SIGNER (Type or print)

N/A

16A. NAME AND TITLE OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print)

PHILLIP S. TRESCH
REGIONAL ACQUISITION AND ASSISTANCE OFFICER

15B. CONTRACTOR/OFFEROR

15C. DATE SIGNED

(Signature of person authorized to sign)

16B. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BY

(Signature of Contracting Officer)

16C. DATE SIGNED

1/22/2010

STANDARD FORM 30 (REV 10-83)

Additional Background Data for Component #4 of RFA 685-10-A-03

The purpose of this amendment is to provide all potential applicants with the January 11, 2010, evaluation recommendations of the "Support to the Casamance Peace Process (SCPP)" Project (a 3-year award by AECOM which ended on September 30, 2009). This amendment is to ensure that all potential applicants have equal and fair access to the most current background/evaluation findings of the previous peace process initiative (which generally apply to Component 4 of RFA 685-10-A-03). Note: In the following recommendations, the reference to SCPP II is specifically referring to a proposed follow-on award, which is now incorporated into Component 4 of subject RFA.

Note: USAID/Senegal is providing the following data as "background information" only; i.e. there is no "implied concurrence" on accuracy or thoroughness of the information; accordingly, these recommendations do not represent the views or recommendations of USAID/Senegal.

Impact of Technical Workshops (TW)

The impact of the Technical Workshops (TWs) can be assessed using Kirkpatrick's four levels of evaluation. The first level - reactions to the training - is the easiest to capture. In the case of the TWs sponsored by the SCPP project, those interviewed who participated in the TWs were almost universally positive about their involvement and ranked the subject matter as relevant to their needs. Level two - whether learning occurred - is more subjective since no objective pre and post training tests were administered to assess knowledge or understanding. The one-day training workshops were all held in 2007 and 2008 so there has been enough time for learning that did occur to begin to be forgotten if not applied. The third level of evaluation - whether new skills were applied by trainees - is almost always impossible to quantify since there has been no tracer study to try to determine the application of results by participants. Finally, level four evaluations - the bottom line - whether applied learning led to tangible results is also difficult to assess. For future TWs, any SCPP-II project should explicitly consider these four evaluation levels and plan workshops so that pre-and post assessments can capture data that could help determine impact.

Impact on Women

Kabonketoor and Usoforal are women's associations dedicated to peace in the Casamance. Both groups are active members of APAC. Women have reached out to combatants via SCPP project-supported APAC initiatives to engage them in dialogue about the importance of peace. APAC focal points for peace in some villages are women. AECOM has made an effort to include women fully in the peace process but more can and should be done in any SCPP-II follow-on project. Accordingly, future projects may wish to include Kabonketoor and Usoforal as possible partners or eligible for sub-grants to build the capacity of women's organizations to be more forcefully involved in the peace process.

Overall Assessment

In any SCPP follow on project, it will be important to reinforce messages delivered in the Facilitated Dialogues (FDs), Technical Workshops (TWs), and by Technical Assistance (TA) in the SCPP-I project through refresher training and renewed dialogues.

Radio Programs for Peace

Radio can be an effective tool for communication in conflict zones, but it needs to be used within a strategic framework. In the case of the SCPP projects grant, it seems the key goal was simply to share the content of the community forums. This is a useful activity but in any SCPP-II, a comprehensive communication strategy document should be prepared that includes radio as a key element. Radio can be used regularly during the entire life of any SCPP-II to deliver message and then reinforce them through varied repetition. Radio clubs could be organized at schools, churches, and mosques; by local NGOs, community associations and others. These groups could be provided with monthly or quarterly radio program schedules with key broadcasts highlighted. A facilitator from an SCPP-II grantee and from community radio stations could help build radio clubs and train local people in "active listening" followed by facilitated discussions. Before and after surveys of the impact of such broadcasts would provide feedback that could sharpen and improve targeting of future broadcasts.

Women and the Group de Contact (GdC) Forums

Several influential Casamancais stressed the key role played by women in the GdC forums. Less than half of forum participants were women yet they constituted the majority from Djibonkor and nearly half of those at Oussouye. SCPP-II could try to determine what motivated much higher female participation from these two areas and try to apply lessons learned from these areas to boost future female participation with the help of local women's organizations.

Recommended Alternatives for Future Interventions

The Evaluation Team was asked whether there are alternatives to the SCPP project. Clearly the alternatives presented below are not lists of activities in a new project but represent alternative strategies in which an SCPP-II could be fitted with its specific and narrower mandate in the political sphere. None of these have received any particular endorsement from USAID, but could be considered by applicants. The alternatives are presented for debate and consideration since it is critical for this type of project to identify and examine all underlying assumptions and alternatives.

Alternative 1 - Defense, Diplomacy and Development (Triple D Option)

1. Acknowledge that some MFDC factions are violently attacking military and civilian targets; that some are becoming criminal enterprises engaged in banditry; and that some MFDC faction leaders have murdered rivals and have pecuniary interests.
2. Accept that the GOS as the duly constituted authority in the Casamance has a legitimate right to self-defense and an obligation to protect its citizens from such attacks.

3. Assume that the great majority of the Casamance people want to be protected from MFDC attacks and understand that the army is not the aggressor.
4. Support the GOS to advance further its concept of army-nation linkages and rule of law by: 1) increasing cooperation between the US (Africom) and/or European militaries via training and incentives to enhance security at the local level and 2) provide visible support for local people by funding GOS free mobile health clinics, school repairs, etc. as the GOS army is already doing.
5. Ensure that all MFDC factions understand that the USAID SCPP-II project is prepared to work to advance the peace process with all those who renounce violence, including the MFDC political factions.
6. Ensure that all MFDC factions understand that the USAID SCPP-II project is a good-faith neutral advocate for peace and does not take positions for or against any issue in contention or for or against any party to the conflict but does support efforts to ensure security for the people of Casamance under threat.
7. Ensure that all parties understand that cooperation with the GOS and the GOS military are aimed at increasing the capacity of the legitimate, elected government of Senegal to non-lethal methods to ensure such security during the peace process.
8. Work with the Senegal judiciary, press and human rights groups to ensure that anyone using violence and captured is given a fair trial and, if convicted, it treated humanely in prison as an example of government restraint and that the justice system functions.
9. Publicize the current amnesty offered to combatants since many people claimed that combatants are not aware that they can return home and not be prosecuted or jailed.
10. Approach Norway (in recent years, Norway has emerged as a leading source of funding for conflict prevention, peace building and negotiations), or other possible sources for money to allow the MFDC to meet in a neutral country and for informal talks to be funded between MFDC factions and GOS officials or non-official "influentials" with conduits into the highest levels of government and with full civil society participation.
11. Empower and support women's groups with more resources to increase their capacity to work for peace at the village level not just through advocacy but by giving their groups the capacity to design and launch development projects in affected areas while also engaging in peace building. Women's groups reported that this approach is more effective than peace advocacy alone.
12. Ensure that these women's initiatives are part of a major, integrated development initiative approved by the GOS that helps spur agriculture, generate incomes and improve social services in the Casamance.
13. Lead a coordinated diplomatic campaign of pressure to compel The Gambia to allow the trans-Gambia highway road and bridge to be completed. This can involve ECOWAS states and the African Union initially and then with UN and other international leverage brought to bear.
14. Improve and extend community radio, develop listening clubs and offer assistance learning on practical topics via radio interlaced with peace messages that can build both economic and social capital.

Alternative 2 - More Fully Integrate Economic and Peace Building Initiatives
(Back to the Future Option)

This alternative seeks to align all the drivers of peace while excluding any engagement with belligerents (either the GOS military or MFDC military wings), excluding support to the GOS military's non-lethal security, communication and development measures.

1. Do not fund an SCPP-II stand-alone project but rather ensure that it is part of a coordinated array of development projects.
2. Insert an independent SCPP-II project into a larger, integrated and multi-donor framework to address economic issues, peace building and advocacy for negotiations synergistically. This will require a programming review of ongoing and future development projects, premised on the principle that conflict prevention will reduce implementation risks to development. This would enhance aid alignment and harmonization consistent with the Paris Principles.
3. A SCPP-II project could have its own project manager and focus exclusively on conflict prevention and advancing the peace process but it could function under the umbrella of a coordinated and aligned Casamance peace and development program (CPDP).
4. A CPDP would need to emerge from the planned World Bank-funded Casamance program and be linked with other multi-lateral (e.g. UN) and bilateral initiatives in the region. For example, on September 16, 2009 the United States Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) launched a five-year \$540 million program for Senegal to help build roads, rural markets, boost agriculture and create economic enterprise zones. The Casamance is one of the target zones for the MCA funds and this may represent another US \$20-\$30 million a year for the region.
5. ANRAC is the GOS entity charged with coordinating development aid for the Casamance. It could continue to serve as the overall coordinating body but a well-staff UNDP unit could pro-actively map all significant development and peace building activities, actively work to link peace and development initiatives by convening meetings of relevant Development Partners and promote multi-sector and multi-year planning.
6. Linking economic and peace building (including advocacy for negotiations) activities has, of course, been tried before (thus, the "Back to the Future" approach) but the prior activity was a USAID-funded program with both of these elements rather than a well-coordinated multi-donor, multi-year and multi-track effort.
7. An SCPP-II project could then 1) help identify target villages and zones at high risk that need both sensitization forums and tangible economic development; 2) carry out a range of participatory mapping exercises and rapid appraisals to link the types of issues and needs in local areas with the types of resources available within an Integrated Program; 3) act as a catalyst to integrate peace messages systematically into all major externally-funded initiatives in Casamance (including those of NGOs, missions and the private sector); 4) provide small grants to continue the successful SCPP-I project civil society capacity building activities, including grants to women's organizations; 5) continue to nurture APAC by carefully funding some institutional capacity; and 6) consider how the GdC might be restructured and, perhaps, renamed, to enhance its capacity to engage MDfC elements.

Alternative 2 suggests that peace building (and efforts specifically to enhance the peace process) be systematically and comprehensively mainstreamed into development projects and that development activities be attached to peace building efforts to allow participants to see clearly the links between promoting peace and economic betterment. This can be done, for example through the following actions:

- Peacebuilding needs to be recognized as a cross-cutting development objective rather than a positive side effect and be incorporated into projects at the design stage. Setting clear peacebuilding objectives for all significant forms of aid in Casamance can add value to traditional development work and bring efficiency gains.
- Development assistance can contribute to peace most effectively when it is planned and implemented in a strategic and coherent way. It is past time for the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness to be implemented and for Senegal's development partners in the Casamance to work together by fully aligning their initiatives and not just holding occasional coordination meetings to share information.
- To integrate conflict prevention initiatives into development programs will require detailed knowledge of local conditions. This is where APAC, CONGAD, Kabanketoor and others can be of great assistance and helped (for example, support from the KCP) to carry out strategic conflict analyses to enable strategic planning. Such planning should have a long-term orientation (15-20 years) with a medium term transition strategy to link more immediate conflict prevention activities with long-term development goals. Any so-called "quick impact" projects also need to be aligned with the long term peace and development strategy.
- To achieve this kind of collaboration, development partners need to build appropriate instruments and procedures which could be a task for a CPDP secretariat to facilitate. For example, inter-ministerial task forces for conflict-affected zones could pin point cross-sectoral development needs and link them to peace building initiatives; the APAC village focal points could become involved in considering the links between development and peace building in their villages and each development agency could designate a peace focal point to work with an CPDP to gradually move toward greater integration that could yield synergies and allow levers for peace to operate more effectively. The CPDP could also building human resource capacity by offering workshops for donor agency and NGO staff to consider how to integrate peace building into development activities.

Alternative 2 is not cheap but a major war would be much more expensive. Much of the resources for the Casamance are already in the pipeline of the World Bank, the MCC, the EU and other donors. The issue is not the need for vast new sums for development but the optimal alignment of all the drivers of peace in Casamance: activities to advance the peace process and advocacy for a resumption of negotiations; development activities targeting areas in greatest peril of renewed conflict and new and more vigorous diplomatic efforts to get the belligerents to the negotiating table.

Alternative 3: Design a follow-on SCPP-II Project that Continues to Generate a Favourable Environment for Negotiations

This alternative continues the work of SCPP-I by building on the accomplishments of the SCPP project with APAC, the GdC, the training and facilitated dialogues and the technical assistance developed over the past three years and reorient it so that it gains efficiency. It would be designed to focus entirely on the political issue of the resumption of negotiations and would benefit from lessons learned by AECOM over the past three years. Such a follow-on project would be premised on the following assumptions and ideas:

- The creation of APAC is an important step forward in advancing the peace process since it enables influential people in Casamance to interact with each other in more structured and systematic ways to advocate for a resumption of negotiations. However, APAC needs more support over a longer period to enhance its effectiveness.
- An SCPP-II would fund a small APAC secretariat and continue with more training and dialogues to enhance capacity. Perhaps a stronger APAC could begin producing "Conflict Issues Briefs" to explore some of the substantive issues that would need to be addressed during negotiations and produce more press releases to increase the pressure for negotiations. It could play a role of reinforcement of the civil society in terms of peace building, integrating new members such as GTZ, APRAN, World Education, Afrique Anjeux, and capitalization of experience, and best practices in that field. APAC could aim to target including new individuals with strong high level connections in the government, by inviting them to trainings/seminars, such as some members of the Collectifs des Cadres. The APAC steering committee could be revised well.
- The establishment of the GdC by ex-combatants and other with SCPP-I support is an important accomplishment since it enhances inter-MFDC dialogue and has helped bring the issue of forgiveness and reconciliation to the village level. However, more work is needed to enable the GdC or a similar entity by another name to function more smoothly.
- Not all MFDC actions have accepted the GdC so the GdC mandate should be stated more clearly and maybe revised so that this is agreed by all the components. Maybe its members should be renewed, or elected for a certain timeframe by other MFDC members, in order to persuade the more recalcitrant factions to participate. New Assise need to be organized and APAC could organize or facilitate this, with supervisions of the project and potentially KPBC support.
- The Regional Administrative Committee (CAR) had some initial success since local government officials attended some well-regarded workshops and the facilitated dialogues were positive. Some joint meetings with local officials of Casamance, Guinea Bissau and Gambia can further build their capacity to understand the challenges linked to the conflict and enable them to advocate for a resumption of negotiations with national GOS officials again and reduce the risks at a local level.
- An SCPP-II could try once again to involve national government leaders in dialogue despite the very limited success with this under SCPP-I. A follow-on project could also try to increase further the involvement of religious leaders in advocating for negotiations and determine how the private sector might also be able to exert influence to promote peace

negotiations. The SCPP should also aim at getting diplomatic assistance, whether American or foreign.

- Since the SCPP-II would focus exclusively on the issue of the peace process, it would not be involved with or try to coordinate its activities with development assistance projects. It would also continue to maintain its distance from ANRAC to preserve its aura of neutrality. It would continue to provide "seed grants" to local partners like CONGAD and APAC, or other relevant partners like World Education, but the amounts would continue to be modest since too much money can cause more problems than it solves.

Alternative 3 is based on the observation that "indirect progress has been made but more work is needed".

Principal Recommendations for a Follow-On SCPP-II Project

Strategic Reassessment

The results of this project evaluation should complement broader analysis by pointing to tactics that have produced results and helped achieve some of the SCPP project's goals. This broader analysis is recommended since, despite the diligence of the implementation team and good work of many in civil society, the net effects of all these initiatives on the primary goal has so far been modest.

Development and Diplomatic Context

Any follow-on activity needs to be placed explicitly within a broader strategic context so that the role of US-funded development initiatives; development assistance and peace initiatives of other development partners; diplomatic efforts and a Phase II SCPP project mesh in ways that optimize the opportunities for and then capture the benefits of project and program synergies. This would require a more pro-active engagement by the SCPP-II team to 1) understand the full range of ongoing and planned development, diplomatic and peace building activities in the Casamance and 2) to pro-actively attempt to influence pipeline projects with respect to geographic and sectoral targeting linked to peace promotion and possible reorientation of components of existing projects to build a critical mass of cross-sectoral initiatives that target the areas of greatest potential conflict and/or risk. This is not the same as ANRAC's role which is to coordinate and monitor development projects on behalf of the GOS.

APAC Capacity Building

The achievements of APAC need to be consolidated and used as a foundation of further peace initiatives but APAC should resist the temptation to become a permanent institution. APAC's mission is to help bring the parties to the conflict to the negotiating table and to help represent Casamance civil society during negotiations. If APAC could be affiliated and "housed" in an existing organization seen as credible and neutral by all parties, it could then benefit from a small secretariat that would be located there. The secretariat could include at least one full-time Senegalese research assistant and an administrative assistant. The research assistant should monitor local and national media outlets; interview individuals with information useful to APAC members; review websites for pertinent information on negotiating strategies, good practices in similar conflicts and possible sources of financial and

technical support; distribute such information to APAC members and make presentations of findings at APAC meetings. The APAC secretariat should then advertise for international volunteer researchers from, for example, graduate schools with conflict resolution programs, to build capacity at low cost. A follow-on SCPP budget could include an amount for lodging and airfare if volunteers pay all other costs.

Groupe de Contact Options

During the design of any SCPP-II project, alternatives to the current GdC structure and composition need to be considered. The fact that the GdC even exists is a testament to the patient, careful work of the AECOM team that has tried to find a mechanism able to reach out to all MFDC factions and move the group toward a more unified position. Unfortunately, the GdC has been unable to persuade some key groups to participate in its initiatives. The goal in a GdC re-design would be to find face-saving ways for those outside the current GdC "tent" to enter by participating in meetings and engaging in a broader dialogue about how to facilitate MFDC unity. Options that can be considered include:

- SCPP-II viewed as a "new" initiative after close out of the current project, might invite all parties to send a representative for the "first meeting" of a "new" temporary working group on MFDC unit facilitation. Such a working group (selecting a neutral new name is important), could consider what "new" structure or approach might enable all the MFDC parties to move toward a general MFDC conferred with SCPP-II support. As an "inclusive" and temporary working group, it might invite most of the members of the old GdC but without the GdC moniker. Preparatory talks with currently non-participating groups and individuals might result in them agreeing to include some or all of the members from the GdC to a "fresh start initiative". All of them might be able to come up with their own name and claim ownership of the "new" facilitation entity.
- The concept of having a working group might visibly emanate from APAC rather than SCPP-II as a way to put more distance between the contractor and the actors.
- Clearly, many of the MFDC faction leaders and their local representatives have large egos and small budgets. The GOS has used money to advance its apparent *de facto* strategy of withering away of the MFDC through co-optation, amnesty, a military "hearts and minds" campaign, economic development and diplomatic initiatives with The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. The MFDC today appears weak, divided and has minimal popular support. At the same time there are a few individuals in some of the factions who, by force of personality or convictions or historical role in the MFDC act as "blockers" to the broader peace process that appears to be desired by the MFDC cadres. The SCPP-II should conduct a careful and confidential assessment to identify such individuals and find ways to sideline them. A few might benefit from an extended study tour, or political asylum in a cooperating country or a job somewhere in Senegal outside the Casamance. Some of the "blockers" are also tired of their struggle but see no option – they can be befriended and advised over time to help some see that there are alternatives for themselves and their familiar.

SCPP-II Implementation Options

The current implementer of SCPP - I has performed well and demonstrated its solid understanding of a complex conflict, has applied good practices in pre-negotiation facilitation and capacity building, and built position personal relationships with many of the players. Greater focus in any follow-on activity should be put on: 1) extensive full-time or frequent intermittent on-the-ground diplomatic experience in conflict zones and in negotiations; 2) interpersonal and cross cultural skills, and 3) an intensive analytical effort to understand and map all facets of the conflict so they can be overlaid and adjusted frequently as part of an ongoing process of strategic assessment.

Office Location

An SCPP-II project should have its primary office in Ziguinchor and a small sub-office in Dakar. The epicenter of the conflict is the Casamance region. The kinds of activities that have been implemented most successfully occurred in the Casamance and in partnership with local NGOs and civil society. More intensive interaction among key project professional staff, the actors and partners in the Casamance and the other development partners working in the Casamance and based in Ziguinchor would likely improve project effectiveness. Further, Ziguinchor is closer to the locations of the various MFDC factions based in Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia and inside Senegal that are the target of the SCPP facilitation efforts.