

## **USAID/EA PEACE III** **Concept Paper**

**Solicitation Number:**

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**Notice Type:**

Sources Sought

**Synopsis:**

Added: February 15, 2013

This is a Request For Information (RFI) for the USAID/EA PEACE III Concept Paper for an anticipated Request for Applications. USAID/EA invites comments on this Concept, with a particular interest in the following. This announcement is a Request for Information (RFI), not a Request for Applications (RFA) and is not to be construed as a commitment by the U.S. Government to issue any solicitation or ultimately award a contract on the basis of this RFI, or to pay for any information submitted as a result of this request. It should be noted that responding to this RFI will not give any advantage to any organization in the subsequent procurement. USAID/EA will not provide answers to any question submitted in response to this request. Responses will be held confidential. Proprietary information should not be sent. This is a Request For Information (RFI) for the USAID/EA PEACE III Concept Paper. The RFI will not accept telephone calls, and neither will it provide for responses to questions with regard to the Concept Paper.

This Concept is intended to take a learning approach to program implementation, in which the implementer would define, in advance of activity implementation, Theories of Change that would shape activities intended to contribute to a particular result. A separate evaluation and learning partner would work with the implementing partner through the life of the program. The evaluation and learning partner would be responsible for: developing methodologies for assessing program outcomes; collaborating on data collection; performing data analysis; developing learning products; and facilitating learning events, which would then feed into adaptation of Theories of Change throughout implementation, as appropriate. Comments on taking such a learning approach are welcome.

This Concept lays out an initial set of Theories of Change under each result. Comments on these Theories of Change are welcome.

Comments on other aspects of the Concept Paper are welcome.

### **Strengthening Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa**

Stability along East Africa's border regions is a central U.S. foreign policy and development priority in the context of regional security and economic integration. However, with numerous political, economic, and governance challenges plaguing the region, improving conflict management can be a daunting task. USAID discussions with partners, lessons learned, and the recent *Regional Conflict and Instability Assessment Report*<sup>1</sup> reveal a multitude of determined, credible, and committed actors at the regional, national, and local levels working to develop and implement initiatives and mechanisms who could, over time, bring more stability, peace, and prosperity to this part of the world. The region is also witnessing a shift in national government commitment to peaceful management of conflicts. New economic development opportunities in the Horn and the rising cost of instability all work to encourage that shift.


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<sup>1</sup> Tetra Tech ARD, *East Africa Regional Conflict and Instability Assessment Report* (Tetra Tech, 2012).

These new political and economic developments, along with the presence of committed and credible actors (regional institutions, governments, civil society) create a window of opportunity for USAID/EA to advance its peace, security, and governance agenda. USAID/EA can do this by supporting and empowering these actors to fulfill their complementary roles in implementing peace-building and conflict management priorities. The hypothesis behind this approach is that IF regional and national institutions provide effective conflict management policies, regulations, and/or interventions and support and engage with strong networks of local actors, such as peace practitioners, sub-national governments, civil society, and the private sector, THEN conflict management systems at local, sub-national, and regional levels will be better sustained and more able to manage and prevent cross-border and regional conflicts in the Horn of Africa. This hypothesis is depicted graphically in the section below. These activities will support the peace and security objectives of the bilateral USAID missions and national governments.

## USAID/EA Programming Purpose

Building on prior regional activity success stories and recommendations in the *Regional Conflict and Instability Assessment Report* completed in May 2012, the purpose of USAID/EA programming efforts will be to Strengthen Cross-Border Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa. This will be achieved through implementation of two separate but interconnected results: Responsiveness of Regional and National Institutions to Cross-Border Conflict Improved and Local Cross-Border Conflict Management Strengthened (see results framework below). To achieve these results, USAID/EA will support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and national Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) so that they can successfully facilitate local, national, and intergovernmental cooperation and responses to cross-border conflict. At the grassroots level, applying lessons learned from the PEACE II program and other activities, USAID/EA will support the strengthening of community-based peace actors and networks, as well as local government institutions to better manage conflict and build peace along East Africa borders.



## **PEACE III Activity Description**

The PEACE III program will address one primary objective, with related results, and a secondary support objective, aligned with the above overall results framework. The majority of program resources are anticipated to be focused on achieving results under the Primary Objective. Activities under the Secondary, Support Objective are anticipated to be developed in response to express interest on the part of CEWARN institutions.

Primary Objective: Strengthen local cross-border conflict management

- Result 1. Communities more open to social reconciliation
- Result 2. Community peace-building capacities mobilized
- Result 3. Local governments partner with their cross-border counterparts and with communities in conflict management
- Result 4. Capacity of regional, national, and/or sub-national Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) partners to support local cross-border conflict management increased

Secondary, Support Objective: Support improved responsiveness of regional and national initiatives to cross-border conflict

- Result 1. Targeted management systems institutions in the CEWARN network strengthened
- Result 2. Targeted initiatives to achieve CEWARN Strategic Framework objectives supported

## ***Background***

At the community level, remarkable improvements in security on the Kenya-Somalia border over the past decade are commonly attributed to the expansion of innovative community peace-building efforts. A growing critical mass of leaders across communities – women, religious, market/business, youth, and elders – are mobilized to mediate disputes before they get out of hand, change cultural practices that encourage inter-communal polarization, and actively seek to break long-standing cycles of violence.

Often, weak governments view these informal governance systems as rivals and seek to undermine them, or see them as irrelevant and ignore them. But when governments view informal authorities as potential partners, new opportunities for hybrid security and governance systems are possible. This has been described as a mediated state model of governance and has been documented in eastern DRC, northern Kenya, South Sudan, and Somalia. In several locations, most notably Kenya, the government has even sought to institutionalize this governance partnership nationally, via local peace and development committees. This type of organizational resilience and responsiveness by some regional governments has been a major source of support to local-level conflict management in East Africa, and in a few instances has helped to transform whole regions of the country into relatively stable and peaceful areas.

USAID design field visits found significant variation among cross-border zones. Peace-building community structures are generally stronger in eastern border zones (Kenya-Somalia-Ethiopia) than western border areas (Kenya-Uganda-South Sudan-Ethiopia). The dense settlement patterns observed in the eastern border areas, as opposed to the sparse pattern in the western border areas, has made it easier for peace initiatives which encourage cross-border cooperation to be effective. In spite of both areas being populated by pastoralists, cattle rustling is much more prevalent in western areas. In eastern areas, Islam is the dominant religion and prohibits cattle rustling. In contrast, clan politics is one of the main cross-border conflict issues in the eastern region. On the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, cattle rustling is combined with kidnapping, especially of children, as the primary set of conflict issues. Involvement of women and youth in peace building is also higher in the eastern border areas. The cultural interpretation of dowry payment as almost akin to buying a bride means that in some eastern locations, most notably on

the Ethiopia side of the Ethiopia-South Sudan border, women must obtain their husband's explicit permission to participate in activities outside the home. This presents a much higher barrier to women's involvement in communal affairs than cultural practices in eastern border zones.

### ***Activity Description and Expected Results***

PEACE III will focus on catalyzing the emergence and development of local peace-building networks in volatile border areas. Such networks provide the best model to date for sustainably addressing conflict, reducing violence, and building stronger inter-communal relations. By linking these networks to the regional CEWARN system through national CEWERUs, USAID assistance will be able to promote action on all levels of conflict and peace issues, from local community relations to national and regional policy issues. Activities will build on the experience of PEACE II and, more broadly, on the approaches thought to have contributed to growing community-level stability evident in many places along the Kenya-Somalia border.

The PEACE III program will be guided Theories of Change (ToCs) that articulate the if-then hypotheses guiding activities under each result. Activity outcomes will be analyzed throughout implementation, allowing for re-assessment and revision of ToCs as activities progress. The ToCs presented herein represent a starting point for the program; evolution of the ToCs is expected as more is learned in the course of implementation. Because some ToCs anticipate multiple outcomes from one activity, a single activity may actually contribute to achieving more than one of the intended results.

It is anticipated that activity-level monitoring will be done through two indicators:

- Percentage of community peace initiatives that receive government support
- Number of new groups or initiatives created through USG funding, dedicated to resolving the conflict or the drivers of the conflict (F indicator 1.6.1-12)

### **Primary Objective: Strengthen local cross-border conflict management**

#### **Result 1: Communities more open to social reconciliation**

USAID/EA design field work and reports of previous activities show that many factors inhibit communities from being open to social reconciliation and collaborative peace. As mentioned, cycles of violence are well established in all of the potential cross-border areas to be targeted. Communities visited during design site visits consistently said that current conflict issues could not be resolved unless prior conflicts were also addressed. In most communities, certain cultural practices also condone or actually promote violence.

Three initial approaches will be taken to change community views on the possibility of reconciliation: 1) trauma education and community healing processes to help change views of "victims" and "perpetrators;" 2) reflective workshops and community-led processes to explore the relationship between culture and conflict; and 3) implementation of jointly managed cross-border projects that help heal community-identified conflict issues (healing peace dividend projects). As communities, the implementer, and USAID learn more about community healing and social reconciliation through activity implementation, additional approaches may be developed and tested.

Killings, rape, destruction of property, cattle-rustling, long-standing discrimination, and government security operations are some of the traumatic events commonly experienced in cross-border areas. Experiencing trauma can overwhelm individual and community ability to cope. Traumatized individuals may suffer from a number of symptoms that can disrupt interpersonal relations, inhibit learning and

ability to work, make individuals more susceptible to drug and alcohol abuse, and, in some cases, can make individuals more prone to extreme anger and violent behavior. At an individual and community level, suppressed, unresolved pain can feed resentment and a desire for revenge, prompting cycles of renewed conflict.

Understanding trauma, its effects on individuals and communities, and how it can be healed from an individual and community perspective, is, therefore, a powerful peace-building approach. These activities allow participants to explore their own experience with trauma, how trauma may have affected their community, and approaches for healing past and recurring trauma. Important elements of the approach include the acknowledgement that “perpetrators” often have their own trauma stories and that “victims” become “perpetrators” in acts of revenge. This awareness allows greater empathy for members of the “other” community to emerge. It also opens new avenues for inter-communal healing by creating a willingness to listen to the “other’s” story and seek solutions that both acknowledge atrocities and create opportunities for “victim” and “perpetrator” communities to heal.

Despite various efforts to mitigate conflict in the region, some individuals and/or communities may feel the urge to retaliate in response to attacks against them. As an alternative to violence, the trauma healing support will aim to empower individuals to both confront those who advocate violence, and encourage individuals to publicly promote long-term nonviolent responses to conflicts and short-term responses to immediate crises in their communities.<sup>2</sup> This will allow healing peace-building cycles to be created in place of cycles of violence.

This activity will offer trauma workshops across all local conflict stakeholders, including the conflicting groups, local government officials, and local security forces. Plans to include security forces in program activities will be reviewed annually to assure compliance with applicable legal restrictions on USAID assistance to security forces, police, intelligence, and military.

Culture is an essential part of conflict and conflict resolution since it shapes our perceptions, attributions, judgments, and ideas of self and other.<sup>3</sup> In the Horn of Africa, certain cultural practices and norms may encourage acts of violence. For example, in the western border areas, spiritual leaders bless the warriors before and after cattle raids. A warrior is believed to have defended the pride of his clan and proven his manhood when he murders a man from the enemy tribe/clan. Songs and dances prepared for such warriors stir other warriors and young men to engage in murder and cattle raids. Women rebuke the warriors who have not been successful in raids rousing them to raid again. In another border zone, young men were reported to murder members of another tribe or clan in order to prove their manhood or impress young women.

This activity will support reflective workshops on culture and its relation to conflict, in which men and women will explore how cultural practices and norms influence inter-communal relations. Which practices are divisive? Which promote collaboration, healing, and/or peace? Which could encourage or discourage violence? And, importantly, how can participants discourage divisive practices and encourage healing practices? USAID/EA program experience has shown that community leaders, men, women, and youth, can play a powerful role in diminishing practices that condone or encourage violence.

USAID/EA program experience has also shown that jointly-identified, managed, and shared community projects can enhance and sustain peace efforts. When planned by communities to address identified

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<sup>2</sup> Carolyn Yoder, *The Little Book of Trauma Healing* (Intercourse: Good Books, 2005), 74-76.

<sup>3</sup> Michelle LeBaron, (July 2003). *Culture and Conflict*. Retrieved from <http://www.beyondintractability.org/bi-essay/culture-conflict>. Accessed at 0919 hrs on 10/26/2012.

conflict issues or wounds, they can be powerful means for bringing communities together. These projects, which can include maternity wards, classrooms, water pans, and peace markets, provide conflicting communities with opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation and often represent an important first step in addressing structural causes of conflict in a community.

## Theories of Change

### Trauma Healing

IF you conduct trauma awareness workshops

THEN people's understanding of conflict-induced suffering in "victims" and "perpetrators" and its relationship to cycles of violence is increased

THEN people have greater empathy for all traumatized people, "victims" and "perpetrators"

THEN people choose to seek inter-communal healing in lieu of revenge

THEN healing peace-building leaders emerge that seek to break cycles of violence through working on jointly developed solutions to inter-communal conflict issues (this outcome contributes to Result 2, Community Peace-building Capacities Mobilized).

### Cultural Practices Adaptation

IF you provide forums for discussing the intersections of violence, conflict, its impact on the communities, and cultural and community norms

AND IF support is provided to formulate strategies and approaches to managing, adapting or tempering cultural practices that contribute to conflict

THEN people will identify cultural practices whose cost in terms of contribution to conflict are too high to be continued

THEN leaders for changing divisive cultural practices and encouraging practices that promote peace will emerge (this outcome contributes to Result 2, Community Peace-building Capacities Mobilized).

IF the initiatives of these cultural change leaders are supported (this input contributes to Result 2, Community Peace-building Capacities Mobilized)

THEN the influence of divisive practices will start to diminish and that of practices that promote peace will begin to expand (this outcome contributes to Result 2, Community Peace-building Capacities Mobilized).

### Healing Peace Dividends

IF you support participatory exploration of trauma, conflict issues, and opportunities to promote healing between communities

AND IF you support communities to develop cross-border projects (peace dividends) to address conflict issues and promote inter-communal healing

THEN you create collaborative community interaction among large segments of the population to counter histories of violence

AND you create interdependent investments in peace among large segments of the population.

IF transparent processes for contracting and managing peace dividends are utilized by joint committees, inclusive of youth and women

THEN you provide new leadership opportunities for youth, women, and men (this outcome contributes to Result 2, Community Peace-building Capacities Mobilized)

THEN you build confidence across key community leaders

AND you build strategic relations between community leaders that can serve as a basis for developing cross-border/cross-community joint action to address conflict and build peace (this outcome contributes to Result 2, Community Peace-building Capacities Mobilized).

### Illustrative Activities

- Support peace and trauma education to increase stakeholder understanding of cycles of violence, broken relationships, and trauma caused by conflict
- Support stakeholder exploration of long-standing grievances and cultural practices that divide communities and how peace-builders can help communities resolve these grievances and change harmful cultural practices
- Implement peace dividend project using transparent, participatory methods, including community contracting

#### Illustrative Indicator

- Percent of activity participants reporting improved attitude toward the community with which they have been in conflict

#### Result 2: Community peace-building capacities mobilized

Activities under this result will focus on promoting the emergence of peace-building leaders from all segments of a community. Peace-building leaders and their organizations will be supported with mentoring, training, and funding to develop peace networks that implement diverse peace-building initiatives to address issues in their communities.

This approach is based on programmatic experience, which shows that effective peace-building in fragile cross-border areas requires engagement of a broad range of capable and committed actors at the local level, including civil society, private sector, women, youth, and religious leaders. It also requires cooperation and coordination within and among these actors along the same border and on both sides of the borders. Provided with capacity and opportunity to jointly engage in peace-building, these actors will leverage their personal skills and community positions to affect peace and create a network of leaders ready and able to facilitate peace-building.

Peace-building initiatives will vary from one community to another. The critical aspect of peace-building initiatives is that they address all layers of conflict causes. These include surface triggers of violence, structural causes of conflict, and unresolved trauma from historical violence. While these are discussed as separate causal layers to aid analytic clarity, any particular conflict incident is likely to have multiple layers in play. For example, a crime against a member of the “other” group may spark collective revenge from the “victim” group. In this instance, the crime is a trigger. In some cases, the crime may be an accepted cultural practice, such as cattle raiding or perpetrating violence to prove manhood. The retaliatory collective revenge violence may be fed by the structural issue of ineffective criminal justice services by the government which failed to address the crime, and by unresolved trauma from historical violence that makes the “victim” group open to seeking collective revenge. Effective peace-building must be able to intervene with rapid response when a potential trigger occurs AND must address the cultural acceptability of violence AND must be able to work with government to develop effective means to address and prevent criminality AND must work on healing past traumas to reduce the ease with which collective revenge can be mobilized. This example illustrates why multiple segments of a community must be mobilized for effective peace-building. No one segment – elders, religious leaders, traditional leaders, professionals or intellectual leaders, women, youth, private sector, local government – could address these multiple causal layers effectively on its own.

Many communities suggested that local customary legal systems and community peace agreements could be strengthened to play a greater role in managing resource sharing between communities and providing adjudication of inter-communal disputes. Some of the weakness cited in field visits and previous program documentation include that community peace accords have not been documented, that they are not widely known, and that traditional systems and community peace agreements are not consistently

recognized by governments. Addressing these and other challenges identified by local leaders may be part of the diverse peace-building initiatives supported in relevant communities.

Opportunities for women and youth to be leaders in peace-building are often constrained by cultural practices, weak leadership skills, lack of confidence, and resource deficits. Both women and youth are critical for peace-building. Women are frequently among the first to choose peace over violence. They also play a strong role in shaping cultural norms for children and youth. Youth are commonly frustrated by lack of opportunity economically, socially, and politically. This makes some susceptible to drug use and at risk of being drawn into conflict. Youth peace leaders have the opportunity for leading concrete achievements in addressing conflict issues, which can help them gain greater respect within their communities. Youth peace leaders can also be powerful influences on their peers. Activities will be specifically targeted to provide leadership opportunities and training for women and youth to maximize their peace-building potential.

### Theories of change

#### Promoting emergence of peace-building leadership

IF diverse segments of a community participate in peace-building outreach activities, such as trauma healing, peace dividends, and/or are exposed to activities of existing peace leader initiatives  
THEN new peace leaders will emerge.

IF peace leaders receive leadership training and mentoring  
THEN they will expand their circles of influence within their communities as an individual and within whatever community groups or organizations with which they are affiliated.

IF opportunities to work with national and regional institutions, e.g. CEWERUs and CEWARN, are provided  
THEN local peace leaders may expand their influence into national and regional circles  
THEN they will be better positioned to lead initiatives addressing structural conflict causes that require national and/or regional action.

#### Women and youth peace-building leadership

IF women and youth have targeted leadership training and opportunities  
THEN more women and youth peace-building leaders will emerge  
THEN women and youth can expand their influence within their peers groups and with other segments of the community.

IF adult male champions of women and youth leadership are supported to influence their peers  
THEN greater acceptance of women and youth leaders can be achieved.

IF women and youth have targeted opportunities to work with national and regional institutions, e.g. CEWERUs and CEWARN  
THEN they may expand their influence into national and regional circles  
THEN they will be better positioned to lead initiatives addressing structural conflict causes that require national and/or regional action

#### Youth initiatives

IF you provide youth with opportunities for constructive engagement and community leadership  
AND IF you provide leadership mentoring and training  
THEN youth are invested in peace and community well-being  
THEN youth will be less likely to engage in violence

THEN youth will actively contribute to community conflict management.

#### Expanding impact of peace-building organizations

IF community organizations with peace-building leaders receive peace-building skills development, appropriate organizational development support, and funding

THEN they will design and implement more effective peace-building initiatives targeting the multiple causal layers of conflict in their communities, which may include trauma healing, social reconciliation, cultural practices and conflict outreach, dispute resolution, conflict rapid response, community-government-security force relations, and/or improving the effectiveness of community peace agreements and traditional justice systems in managing conflict issues.

#### Peace networks

IF peace-building organizations and leaders are encouraged to work together through participating in joint training, joint and/or coordinated projects, and coordination mechanisms such as peace committees

THEN they can develop mutual appreciation for unique organizational strengths and peace-building interests

THEN a sense of a community peace-building network can emerge.

IF joint network conflict analysis and peace-building initiatives are supported

THEN networks can more effectively address the multiple causal layers of conflict.

#### Peace network sustainability

IF a critical mass of community leaders and organizations are active in peace-building

IF peace network initiatives rely primarily on mobilizing local resources

IF peace networks are able to mobilize additional resources from national and/or regional sources, e.g. CEWERUs and CEWARN

IF peace organizations and networks integrate learning approaches, such as action research and appreciative inquiry, into their practice

IF peace organizations and networks have forums for sharing learning, successes, challenges, and innovations

THEN networks will become increasingly self-sustaining from organizational, financial, and knowledge/skill perspectives

#### Illustrative Activities

- Support stakeholder exploration of local conflict causes, what binds communities together, and opportunities to manage disputes before they erupt into violence
- Support establishment and strengthening of cross-border sector response networks including peace committees, youth, women, religious mediation councils, community policing, business and professional associations, and livestock market mediators
- Support women and youth conflict management and transformation leadership trainings and activities
- Support revitalization and awareness-raising of inter-communal conflict management agreements
- Promote the use of traditional conflict resolution approaches through sensitization and information programs in communities
- Support efforts to increase sustainability of local networks and their engagement with national and regional bodies on priority conflict resolution efforts

#### Illustrative indicators:

- Number of local women participating in a substantive role or position in peace-building process supported with USG assistance (F indicator 1.6-6)

- Number of new groups or initiatives created through USG funding, dedicated to resolving the conflict or drivers of the conflict (F indicator 1.6.1-12)

For this result, the standard indicator for new groups and initiatives would aggregate the number of community organizations newly mobilized for peace-building and the number of new peace activities led by USG supported peace networks.

**Result 3:** Local governments partner with their cross-border counterparts and with communities in conflict management

Activities under this result will focus on promoting the emergence of peace-building leaders from among local government officials. For the purposes of this program, the term “local government officials” includes all government officials located in the targeted cross-border zones, whether they are part of the local government administration or are national government or line ministry officials posted to the area. Peace-building leaders in government will be supported with mentoring, training, and in-kind support for peace-building initiatives that promote greater government responsiveness to conflict issues and that partner with civil society peace networks to address issues in their communities. To the extent allowed under USG restrictions on USAID assistance to police, intelligence, and military, local security officials will be invited to participate in outreach activities such as trauma healing and planning of peace initiatives. A detailed legal review will be done with the implementing partner during program launch. On-going communication on involvement of security officials in program activities will be maintained, particularly in the review of the implementing partner’s annual work plan.

As the entry point for communities into all levels of government, local governments have an important role in conflict management and peace-building. Local government and local security officials are the gateway for government response to community needs. They are the people on the ground who community members can petition to address conflict issues. Despite this key role, local government performance in productive conflict management is highly mixed. Local governments have never been a direct partner for USAID/EA cross-border conflict management programming.

In many of the potential target cross-border zones, mechanisms for sharing security information between local governments exist. Several local governments also play a role in, or have links to, peace committees and CEWARN field monitors responsible for sending conflict alerts. On the Kenya-Uganda border, field visits found that cooperation between local governments has been successful in resolving conflicts related to cattle rustling. On the Kenya-Somalia border, a local government official who had been transferred from an area in which he had worked with USAID/EA peace-building partners to an area where the program did not work took the initiative to encourage establishment of youth for peace activities. In South Sudan, a local government official who had worked with earlier bilateral USAID peace programming saw many opportunities to build peace in his jurisdiction and was eager to participate in this new activity. In contrast, local administration officials on the Kenya-Ethiopia border viewed tribal conflict as an issue of the local communities which was not their responsibility. Also in Kenya, much local conflict has been driven by politicians, particularly as they seek to position themselves in advance of the 2013 elections. Finally, in their role of coordinating development projects, local government can have an influence on the degree to which such projects are divisive or promote peace. Although well-intentioned, economic development projects can spark or exacerbate conflict. A borehole dug by the Kenyan government sparked renewed violence between the Garre and Murulle clans on the Kenya-Somalia border in 2008.

The time is ripe for engaging local governments as direct partners. Under the new CEWARN Strategic Framework, mechanisms for communication between local community peace-builders, local government, security forces, and national government are to be expanded. Greater emphasis is to be placed on

maintaining on-going communication among these groups in fragile cross-border zones. Further, three countries in the Horn are under-going changes in their local government systems. Kenya is establishing directly elected county governments with greater service delivery authority. CEWARN and the Kenya CEWERU, with USAID/EA support, are developing conflict briefings and suggested 100 day conflict management action plans for newly elected county governments. Somalia is seeking to consolidate local governance in territory taken from Al Shabaab. And, South Sudan is continuing its efforts to develop state governments as effective federal states.

## Theories of change

### Promoting emergence of peace-building leadership

IF local government officials participate in peace-building outreach activities, such as trauma healing, peace dividends, and/or are exposed to initiatives of existing peace leader  
THEN new local government peace leaders will emerge.

IF local government peace leaders receive leadership training and mentoring  
THEN they will expand their circles of influence within their communities as an individual and within their government entity.

IF opportunities to work with national and regional institutions, e.g. CEWERUs and CEWARN, are provided  
THEN local government peace leaders may expand their influence into national and regional circles  
THEN they will be better positioned to lead initiatives addressing structural conflict causes in their localities that require local, national, and/or regional government/intergovernmental action.

### Expanding impact of local government peace-building initiatives

IF government organizations at the local level with peace-building leaders receive peace-building skills development, appropriate organizational development support, and in-kind material support  
THEN they will design and implement more effective peace-building initiatives targeting multiple causal layers of conflict in their localities, which may include dispute resolution, conflict rapid response, cross-border community-government-security force relations and coordination, improving coordinated operation between formal justice sector and community peace agreements and traditional justice systems, and/or conducting/promoting conflict-sensitive development.

### Local governments and peace networks

IF local governments and security officials are encouraged to work with their cross-border counterparts and civil society peace-building organizations through participating in joint training, joint and/or coordinated projects, and coordination mechanisms such as peace committees  
THEN they can develop mutual appreciation for unique organizational strengths and peace-building interests  
THEN a sense of a peace-building partnership can emerge between cross-border governments, security forces, and civil society.

IF joint partnership conflict analysis and peace-building initiatives are supported  
THEN these partnerships can more effectively address the multiple causal layers of conflict.

### Illustrative Activities

- Support training to understand cross-border governance systems, conflict-sensitive development, conflict dynamics, and options for mitigating conflict
- Establish/strengthen cross-border local government conflict management and coordination mechanisms

#### Illustrative Indicator

- Number of new groups or initiatives created through USG funding, dedicated to resolving the conflict or drivers of the conflict (F indicator 1.6.1-12)

For this result, the standard indicator for new groups and initiatives would aggregate the number of local government entities newly mobilized for peace-building and the number of new peace activities led by local governments.

**Result 4:** Capacity of regional, national, and/or sub-national Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) partners to support local cross-border conflict management increased

To further support the sustainability of local peace networks and the regional CEWARN system, PEACE III will identify Horn of Africa NGOs working on peace-building and conflict management with an interest in supporting local, cross-border peace-building. Such NGOs may specialize in a region of a country, such as Karamoja in Uganda or northeastern Kenya, or they may be national NGOs, or they may work in more than one Horn of Africa country. The ultimate goal of this result is to build Horn of Africa capacity to continue support and mentorship for cross-border peace networks.

#### Illustrative Approaches and Activities

- Identify Horn of Africa NGOs as implementing partner sub-grantees that may run sub-offices in particular border zones, managing specific elements of program implementation
- Provide institutional capacity building in relevant areas, e.g. financial management, monitoring and evaluation, strategic planning, fund-raising, small grant management
- Provide technical training and mentoring in approaches to peace-building and building capacity of community-based organizations

#### Secondary, Support Objective: Support improved responsiveness of regional and national initiatives to cross-border conflict

Result 1. Targeted management systems institutions in the CEWARN network strengthened

Result 2. Targeted initiatives to achieve CEWARN Strategic Framework objectives supported

IGAD/CEWARN has emerged as the leading regional actor in conflict management in the Horn of Africa. Improving responsiveness of CEWARN and CEWERUs to cross border conflict is central to achieving the above stated purpose. PEACE III will coordinate and collaborate with CEWARN institutions throughout program implementation. As requested, the PEACE III program may provide technical and operational assistance to CEWARN, CEWERUs, and related institutions to strengthen particular management systems and/or implement particular initiatives relevant to achievement of objectives under the CEWARN Strategic Framework. Examples of assistance include supporting engagement and cooperation of CEWARN and CEWERUs with local community peace networks, providing technical assistance on peace-building approaches, and supporting strategic planning.

#### **Geographic Location**

This aspect of the project will target specific cross-border locations within the cross-border zones listed below. These zones were identified by CEWARN, CEWERU, local government officials, and USAID bilateral missions in the 2012 RCMG Partners' Meeting. Selection of final locations for Year 1 will be made in conjunction with USAID bilateral missions.

Kenya-Uganda

- Moroto-Loima
- Amueti-West Pokot

Kenya-South Sudan

- Lokichoggio-Kapoeta

Ethiopia-South Sudan

- Gambella-Jonglei/Upper Nile

Kenya-Ethiopia

- Lake Turkana
- Moyale-Moyale

Kenya-Somalia

- Mandera-Gedo
- Wajir-Upper Juba
- Garissa-Lower Juba



Submit responses to this RFI to Ali M Ali at [alalie@usaid.gov](mailto:alalie@usaid.gov) or Linda McElroy at [lmcelroy@usaid.gov](mailto:lmcelroy@usaid.gov) **no later than Thursday, February 28, 2013 at 4:00PM Nairobi Time.**